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ABSTRACT
The institution of university science research has evolved over
the past century, from one of open science and free information to
one of competition and jealously guarded intellectual property
rights. This iBrief analyzes the background factors driving the
evolution of the institution of science, evaluates the net effects on
the progress of science, and considers potential short-term
solutions to alleviate the legal transaction costs necessary for
scientific collaboration.

INTRODUCTION
¶1
Negotiation, contracts, licensing, and lawyers in general only cause
headaches for most university scientists. Time spent doing paperwork or
dealing with legal issues only serves to detract from time scientists would
otherwise spend on valuable research. Unfortunately for scientists,
intellectual property law and policy changes over the course of the 20th
Century, and particularly the last several decades, have produced a steady
increase in transaction costs necessary to facilitate scientific inquiry. These
intellectual property transaction costs increase the expense of performing
research and slow the pace of scientific progress. This iBrief examines the
legal and policy shifts impacting science, analyzes the resulting impact on
the scientific endeavor, and advocates for one organization’s efforts to
minimize the transaction costs embedded in scientific collaboration.

I. PARADIGM SHIFTS IN UNIVERSITY SCIENCE RESEARCH
Thomas Kuhn, in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, famously
constructs the concept of a paradigm shift to explain the process of
scientific change. 2 Kuhn describes the cyclic emergence of scientific
novelties or discoveries which “subvert the existing tradition of scientific
¶2
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practice.” 3 The cycle begins with an initial set of beliefs through which
“normal science” is conducted – for example, the Ptolemeic view of the
earth-centered universe or the 18th Century Newtonian paradigm that light
was made up of particles. Upon discovering seemingly anomalous
information that cannot be reconciled with the current paradigm, scientists
are forced to reject previous assumptions and tightly held beliefs. “A
scientist’s world is qualitatively transformed [and] quantitatively enriched
by fundamental novelties of either fact or theory.” 4 The result of this shift,
after the dust settles, is an entirely new paradigm. 5
¶3
Kuhn recognizes that social and cultural context may contribute to
the success or failure of existing scientific paradigms. 6 More than mere
contribution, however, law and policy in the 20th century constructed and
safeguarded a paradigm of open science 7 through which university science
research thrived. Open science, as explained by sociologist Robert Merton,
involves four behavioral norms which together fostered a collaborative
scientific environment throughout much of the 20th Century. 8 First,
“universalism” means that the scientific enterprise should be open to all
interested participants. 9 Second, “communalism” means that ideas should
be owned by no one and shared with all. 10 Third, “disinterestedness”
requires that the scientist should rise above his or her individual
subjectivity. 11 Finally, “organized skepticism” mandates that discoveries be
subject to peer review. 12
¶4
As with every preceding scientific paradigm, however, open science
is now under increased pressure to change in the wave of intellectual
property law and policy developments of the past century. In the emerging
paradigm, science research is increasingly commercial instead of open, and
increasingly proprietary instead of public. While commercializing science
has lowered some barriers, such as commercial access to medicine, it has
raised others.
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A. Erosion of Subject Matter Boundaries in Intellectual Property
¶5
Both patent and copyright doctrines deny protection to certain types
of raw information. A “universally understood” tenet of U.S. copyright law
is that “facts are not copyrightable.” 13 Analogously, “[p]henomena of
nature, . . . mental processes, and abstract intellectual concepts” are not
patentable.” 14 These doctrines reveal a common understanding that certain
types of information should not be owned by individuals but should instead
remain universally accessible in the public domain. The public domain
provides a foundation of shared knowledge that is freely accessible to all
and includes facts, abstract ideas, other unprotectable information, and all
information for which the intellectual property protection has lapsed. 15

The longstanding policy supporting the public domain in U.S.
intellectual property law is rooted in the Constitution. The Constitution
limits Congress’ power to grant creators “exclusive Right[s]” to their
creations: works must be “Writings [or] Discoveries” and the right must
last only for “limited Times.” 16 Thus, facts or abstract ideas do not qualify
as “Writings [or] Discoveries.” Furthermore, the “limited Times”
requirement ensures that once a creator reaps sufficient rewards from a
work, the work will enter and enrich the public domain. 17
¶6

¶7
Some forms of information, however, only exist in the public
domain and are never exclusive. Subject matter restrictions ensure that
intellectual property protection applies only to “Writings and
Discoveries,” 18 not raw information. In the copyright realm, “facts do not
owe their origin to any individual” and thus “are part of the public domain
available to every person.” 19 Similarly, “[a]n idea itself is not
patentable.” 20
¶8
The understanding that basic facts, natural phenomena, and other
abstractions are not protectable forms of information has eroded
significantly over the course of the 20th Century. Before Parke-Davis & Co.
v. H.K. Mulford Co., 21 patents for naturally occurring substances were
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uniformly rejected. 22 Parke-Davis altered this trend by upholding a patent
granted for a purified naturally occurring substance, calling it “a new thing
commercially and therapeutically.” 23 This holding opened the door for
patent coverage for isolated gene fragments. 24 Next, Diamond v.
Chakrabarty established that living organisms could constitute patentable
subject matter. 25 Finally, mathematical formulas and algorithms contained
in otherwise patentable machines and processes now constitute patentable
subject matter, 26 even when the result of the process is as abstract and
intangible as a number. 27
¶9
As in patent doctrine, the borders of copyright protection have also
been stretched. Although the inability to copyright facts has not been
questioned, 28 the copyrightability of compilations of facts, in the form of
scientific databases for example, is a current matter of contention. Under
the 1976 Copyright Act, a compilation includes “a work formed by the
collection and assembling of . . . data that are selected, coordinated, or
arranged in such a way that the resulting work as a whole constitutes an
original work of authorship.” 29 The underlying facts, however, remain free
and unprotected.
¶10
In contrast, the European Parliament and the Council of the
European Union issued Directive 96/9/EC on the legal protection of
databases, which established sui generis protection for the factual contents
of databases, thus extending protection from mere compilations of facts to
individual facts themselves. 30 On several fronts, U.S. law is approaching a
similar result. First, several bills have proposed some form of database
protection. 31 Second, databases and their contents may already be guarded
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under alternate legal theories including unfair competition, contractual
reach-through agreements, and trade secrets. 32
¶11
By gradually increasing the domain of intellectual property
protection to include previously unprotectable information, the potential
economic value of raw scientific “building blocks” has dramatically
increased. The incentive to seek patents for substantially factual material,
algorithmic processes, gene sequences, and other previously unprotectable
subject matter has altered the incentive structure in scientific research.
While “open science” inventors contented themselves with non-economic
rewards of paper publication credit, esteem, self-gratification, and a certain
degree of fame, today’s scientists must also seek patents to be successful.
Patents represent economic value and may eventually benefit the public, but
they also increase competitiveness among scientists and cause major
reluctance to collaborate.

B. Erosion of Government Commitment to the Public Domain
¶12
To complement the constitutional commitment to enriching the
public domain, long-term policy decisions have encouraged public
availability of government resources.
By statute, all potentially
copyrightable government-created works fall immediately into the public
domain. 33 Similarly, the government may only grant exclusive licenses to
its own inventions when “the public will be served by the granting of the
license,” 34 preventing public resources from being used for exclusively
private gain.
¶13
Departing significantly from the expectation that government works
should be available to the public for the common good, the 1980 Bayh-Dole
Act 35 ushered in a new era of privatized science. The Act “codified”
existing U.S. policy allowing scientists to patent their inventions, even
when their research was government funded. 36 The act sought to “promote
widespread utilization of federally-sponsored inventions” and to “motivate
private investors to pick up where government sponsors left off and
transform new discoveries into commercial products.” 37
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Bayh-Dole presents a strong individual incentive to take all forms
of scientific research to the stage of economic viability in the market by
granting patent rights to inventors instead of to the government funding
agency and allowing exclusive licensing for commercial development. For
federally funded research that is relatively “downstream,” the act
encourages scientists to take the final step in creating publicly marketable
and beneficial products. 38 For research in only the initial phases of basic
science, through which fundamental research tools are explored and
developed, the act provides a somewhat perverse incentive to privatize at a
very early stage of research:

¶14

Universities have taken the opportunity to file patent applications on
basic research discoveries, such as new DNA sequences, protein
structures, and disease pathways, that are primarily valuable as inputs
into further research, thereby accelerating the encroachment of the
patent system into what was formerly the domain of open science.
Even when they do not seek patents, universities often seek to preserve
their expectations for profitable payoffs by imposing restrictions on
the dissemination of research materials and reagents that might
generate commercial value in subsequent research. 39
¶15
Although the act provides incentives for commercialization and
public distribution of useful scientific developments, the resulting extreme
privatization and “deterioration in the culture of upstream research” 40
lessens the outright success of the legislation.
¶16
There is, however, a counter-movement recognizing that publicly
financed research results should be made available to everyone. In
September of 2004, The National Institutes of Health (“NIH”) proposed a
policy that would require all “scientific information arising from NIHfunded research [to be] available in a timely fashion to other scientists,
health care providers, students, teachers, and the many millions of
Americans searching the web to obtain credible health-related
information.” 41
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This proposition has not been adopted, due at least in part to “a
quick and panicked response from scientific publishers” 42 who would
undoubtedly lose their significant market advantage if information was open
to the public instead of restricted to subscription services. 43 The U.S.
House of Representatives Appropriations Committee, however, supported
the proposed policy. The Committee expressed strong concern that “there is
insufficient public access to reports and data resulting from NIH-funded
research” and that the situation, “which has been exacerbated by the
dramatic rise in scientific journal subscription prices, is contrary to the best
interests of the U.S. taxpayers who paid for this research.” 44 Despite the
public concern regarding the availability of scientific research, Bayh-Dole
remains the controlling policy determining the allowable uses of the fruits
of publicly funded research.
¶17

II. BARRIERS TO SCIENTIFIC PROGRESS
The increasing expansion of protectable subject matter from
algorithms to gene fragments, combined with the vast increase of
commercialization at all stages of research, has significantly increased both
the economic incentive to participate in scientific research and the legal
savvy needed to compete successfully in the market. In effect, the scientific
institution has shifted from one of collaborative development to one of
competition and secrecy.
¶18

A. Increased Transaction Costs in Conducting Science Research
¶19
One highly notable consequence of the shifts in law and policy over
the 20th century is the intellectual property protection available to
biomedical research tools developed far upstream in the scientific pipeline.
Before Bayh-Dole and the push to commercialize, “[u]npatented biomedical
discoveries were freely incorporated in ‘downstream’ products for
diagnosing and treating disease.” 45 Today, a gene sequence may be
patented at the first moment of isolation, even without knowledge of the
specific role it will play in a commercial product. 46
¶20
While this development is undoubtedly of economic benefit to
certain scientists, upstream protection of basic research tools vastly
increases downstream costs to incorporate projects involving diverse and
42
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possibly conflicting sets of rights. 47 Upstream patents over gene sequences,
for example, require complex transactional agreements at each subsequent
stage of research. Subsequent protectable inventions could include (1) an
organism designed to host the patentable gene, (2) a protein produced by the
host organism, (3) research databases, and (4) a marketable drug. In effect,
“[e]ach upstream patent allows its owner to set up another tollbooth on the
road to product development, adding to the cost and slowing the pace of
downstream biomedical innovation.” 48 The cost of a downstream product
compounds with each toll. The increased price the public pays outweighs
the initial gain to the few upstream scientists.
Furthermore, these “concurrent fragments” create what Heller and
Eisenberg call a “tragedy of the anticommons” when “multiple owners each
have a right to exclude others from a scarce resource and no one has an
effective privilege of use.” 49 In an atmosphere of competition and secrecy,
granting exclusive rights over upstream products will more likely lead to
market shortages than to productive bargaining. 50
¶21

¶22
Universities, federal laboratories, hospitals, and private research
institutions often wish to use materials developed elsewhere. 51 The
institutional and legal mechanism developed to cope with the potential
tangle of intellectual property rights over research tools – including genes,
cell lines, and other biological products – is a type of contractual
arrangement known as materials transfer agreements (“MTAs”). 52 MTAs
are binding contracts that provide a common understanding of how the
materials may be used by the parties. 53
¶23
MTAs define the “material” in question and may include a broad
range of terms and restrictions. These may stipulate allowable uses of the
material, define allowable uses and ownership of derivative materials,
require assignment or compulsory licensing of downstream intellectual
property, limit academic credit derived from the material, control future
transfer of the material, and a host of other restrictions. 54
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B. Result of Heightened Transaction Costs
¶24
Negotiating an MTA is a time consuming and costly procedure,
even between collegial and friendly parties. 55 Although “many transfers
within academia are still informal . . . use of an MTA is recommended so
that disputes about use do not arise.” 56 Even if a material is offered for free,
universities warn scientists that “informal transfers done without MTAs
confer little protection on either the provider or the recipient.” 57 In the
worst situations, an unwilling or hostile party can delay a transfer or require
unreasonable terms. Such delays may cost scientists research windows,
grant opportunities, and generally delay the progress of research. 58
¶25
All time spent negotiating MTAs detracts from time spent
performing valuable research and slows the flow of information between
scientists. Various empirical studies confirm the prevalence of the problem.
For instance, Eric Campbell’s study on data withholding among academic
geneticists in the Journal of the American Medical Association found that
forty-seven percent of academic geneticists surveyed who had asked “other
faculty for additional information, data, or materials regarding published
research reported that at least one of their requests had been denied in the
preceding 3 years.” 59 Because of the transaction overhead, scientists simply
choose not to share materials. 60

Whether a scientist chooses to collaborate using an MTA or refuses
to put in the time and effort to do so, the progress of science suffers. Using
an MTA delays real science by imposing legal transaction costs. Refusing
to transfer materials to avoid such transaction costs slows the progress of
science by denying others the use of valuable scientific resources. Under
imposing pressures to develop marketable and profitable inventions, the
institutional and legal barriers to the flow of scientific information only
serve to increase the barriers to scientific innovation.
¶26

III. TOWARDS EFFICIENCY THROUGH STANDARD LICENSING
¶27
The tangle of downstream intellectual property rights created by
“concurrent fragments” and “tollbooth[s] on the road to product
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development” will not become untangled without significant legislative
reform. Rather, immediate efforts to alleviate the high transaction costs of
collaboration in science research must focus on simplifying the process of
sharing. If scientists could use an MTA to share valuable materials without
significant effort or expense, they would have much greater incentive to do
so.

A. Existing MTA Simplification Efforts
The most significant effort to simplify MTAs has been the creation
of the Uniform Biological Material Transfer Agreement (“UBMTA”). The
U.S. Public Health Service and representatives from academia and industry
created the UBMTA “to address concerns about contractual obligations
imposed by some MTAs and to simplify the process of sharing proprietary
materials among public and nonprofit organizations.” 61 The ideal result of
a UBMTA would be to “reduce the administrative burden of sharing
materials as investigators come to rely on common acceptance of its terms
by cooperating organizations.” 62 Since 1995, over 250 institutions have
undertaken efforts to adopt the UBMTA into use. 63
¶28

Despite the numerous signatories pledging to use the standard
agreement, the UBMTA has delivered only “limited success.” 64 Instead of
adhering to a standard agreement, many institutions have merely
“substituted their own form agreement for the UBMTA,” adding “more
restrictive” terms. 65 Critics see these deviations as “unsurprising” because
“university technology transfer officials . . . tend to see their primary job as
bringing licensing revenue into the university,” 66 not lowering the
transaction costs of collaboration. Furthermore, even the creators of the
UBMTA realize that it “may not be appropriate for every material
transfer,” 67 conceding the potential need for contractual customization.
¶29

¶30
Customization of the UBMTA for unique materials, particular
parties, or for more restrictive terms undermines the entire purpose of a
61
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standard contract. Customization requires negotiations, new understanding
of the changes, bulky bureaucratic involvement, and results in many of the
original problems introduced by MTAs.

B. The Science Commons Approach: Configurable Digital Licensing
¶31
Creative Commons, a non-profit organization that provides
standard, digital licenses for online copyrightable media, recognizes both
the challenges inherent in standardizing MTAs and the potential economic
and social benefits of doing so successfully. 68 Creative Commons offers a
free, online content licensing service to allow internet users to share photos,
writing, music, and the like. 69 The licenses alter the standard contours of
copyright law to allow sharing of a work under certain conditions – such as
for non-commercial use only or requiring proper attribution credit – while
allowing the creator to retain a “some rights reserved” version of
copyright. 70
¶32
The two most unique components of Creative Commons licensing
are two features lacking in the UBMTA efforts. First, the license is
configurable for different situations.
Without sacrificing license
compatibility and interoperability, a user may choose from a range of
restrictions such as creation of derivative works, use for non-commercial
purposes only, and subsequent distribution restrictions. 71 Second, Creative
Commons publishes the license in a digital format, by which search engines
like Yahoo and others may locate material offered under a Creative
Commons license. 72
¶33
Science Commons, one of Creative Commons’ newest and most
innovative projects recognizes that “a standard, open framework for
managing material transfer can catalyze innovation.” 73 Science Commons
seeks to apply the Creative Commons licensing model to the creation of a
new version of a uniform MTA. 74
¶34
A Science Commons MTA must include sufficiently standard terms
to decrease the transaction costs of collaboration while maintaining an array
of configurable terms diverse enough to avoid the splintering effect

68
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experienced by the UBMTA. Like the suite of Creative Commons licenses,
a Science Commons MTA must define the material in question and allow
investigators and technology managers to select more or less restrictive
terms of use, downstream requirements for derivative works, and attribution
requirements. The range of configurable options must derive from the
existing range of MTAs used by scientists and universities today. Also like
the Creative Commons licenses, a Science Commons MTA would function
most efficiently in a digital format. If scientists could license materials to
colleagues or search for materials from others with no more effort than
several clicks of a mouse, they would be less likely to withhold the
“information, data, and materials . . . vital . . . to the efficient advancement
of science.” 75
¶35
While the Creative Commons licensing system has achieved major
recognition and use, 76 application of the Creative Commons licensing
model to scientific transactions will present major challenges. Most
fundamentally, the Creative Commons license involves copyrighted works
while a Science Commons license would involve a transfer of physical
goods or information not subject to copyright. This difference, at the very
least, will require significant re-tooling of the Creative Commons licensing
machinery. Furthermore, Creative Commons licensing involves only the
simple case of an individual licensing creative works for use on the Internet.
Science Commons, in contrast, involves significantly more complex and
sophisticated parties. As large institutions, universities are subject to laws,
rules, policies, and practices that make even the smallest of changes
difficult and time consuming. Even more restricting to universities are
economic considerations. Technology transfer offices, already concerned
with the proverbial bottom line, will avoid changes that present even the
appearance of endangering the university’s revenue stream. Finally, while
Creative Commons had no competing licenses to consider, Science
Commons is entering a domain occupied by existing licensing procedures.
¶36
Science Commons must harness these institutional challenges to its
advantage. With many existing relationships with universities and their
technology transfer offices, Science Commons must continue to facilitate
dialogue about transactional barriers to science. Instead of fighting the
existing licensing systems, Science Commons should use existing university
technology transfer infrastructure as a starting point for launching efficient
digital licenses. Like any development of a community standard, adoption
of new licensing standards must be a community effort.

75
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When digital licensing of scientific tools and information can
accommodate a wide range of contractual possibility while still maintaining
compatibility and interoperability, scientists will hopefully chose to
collaborate in the spirit of open science while still preserving their
intellectual property rights crucial to competing in the modern scientific
paradigm. Like any paradigm shift, the transition from open science to
intellectual property science involves an inevitable degree of chaos and
experimentation. Although the success of Science Commons is yet to be
determined, it must be applauded for fostering dialogue focusing on
minimizing the problematic aspects of the new paradigm.
¶37

CONCLUSION
¶38
The broad expansion of protectable intellectual property subject
matter and the commercialization of science may be inevitable
characteristics of modern science. Unreasonably high barriers to research
collaboration and the scientific progress, however, are not inevitable factors
to be taken lightly. If nothing else, the UBMTA effort has highlighted the
common frustrations caused by the complicated and expensive process of
materials transfer and the community support available to standardization
efforts. Of the modern efforts to standardize, Science Commons approach
to licensing, combining standardized digital licensing with fluid and
customizable terms of agreement, has the best chance of success. When
implemented, a Science Commons license could remove barriers to
collaboration and increase the general pace of scientific collaboration and
progress.

